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Abstract
Motivated by the “shocking” evidence of non-stationary behavior
of money market spreads during the crisis, we investigate the economic
and statistical features of money market turbulence by means of a
Fractionally Integrated Heteroskedastic Factor Vector Autoregressive
model. This approach allows for an accurate modelling of the persis-
tence properties of the data, and to decompose the EURIBOR-OIS
spreads into three components bearing an economic interpretation.
We ﬁnd that the increasing trend in the spreads after August 2007
was broken and reversed in December 2008. This coincides with the
timing of a large ECB policy rate cut which, together with other policy
measures, paved the way for a gradual reversal in market sentiment,
and reduction in credit and liquidity risks.
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11 Introduction
The evolution of the spreads between unsecured money market rates of vari-
ous maturities and central banks’ key policy rates has been subject to consid-
erable debate and controversy in relation to the worldwide ﬁnancial market
turbulence that started in August 2007. Central to the recent controversy
are the relative roles of liquidity and counterparty (credit) risks in explain-
ing the size and dynamics of various money market spreads and the term
structure of the spreads. Understandi n gw h a ta r et h em a j o rd r i v i n gf o r c e s
behind the evolution of money market spreads has important implications
for central bank policy, which is likely to be more eﬀective in addressing
liquidity problems (i.e. via Lender of Last Resort intervention) than for ad-
dressing solvency issues (which should be addressed by the ﬁscal authorities
or through a banking resolution mechanism). In this debate there are two
opposing views, particularly in the USA. On the one side of the debate, the
ﬁnancial crisis is seen as one of banking solvency, a view most prominent
among academic economists, and vividly expressed by Taylor and Williams
(2009); the authors in this camp strongly criticize central banks’ liquidity
interventions during the crisis for being either wrong or misguided and, at
best, having had no eﬀect. On the other side of the debate one ﬁnds, not
surprisingly, mainly central bank economists, which tend to see the crisis as
evolving in various stages, being the initial stage marked mainly by liquidity
problems, subsequently “metastasized” into a solvency crisis; these authors
tend to see central bank liquidity injections as rather appropriate and suc-
cessful, at least during the ﬁrst stages of the turbulence (see among others
Christensen et al., 2009; McAndrews et al., 2008; Wu, 2008).
In this respect, it should be noted that a rigorous evaluation of the impact
of central bank policies is plagued with diﬃcult methodological problems.
First and foremost, the counterfactual cannot be known; thus, whether and
where central bank policies made a diﬀerence cannot be rigorously tested.
Second, central bank interventions during the crisis amounted to replacing
private ﬁnancial intermediation that was sharply shrinking. A sharp and sud-
den shrinkage of the ﬁnancial sector would have had a devastating impact on
the “real” economy. Third, by accepting as collateral for reﬁnancing secu-
rities that suddenly became illiquid (i.e. ABS), even without increasing the
overall liquidity supply, central banks prevented a massive failure of ﬁnancial
institutions worldwide; even if those interventions did not have an immediate
and visible impact on money market spreads, they may have prevented the
emergence of even wider money market spreads and disorderly conditions in
a broad range of ﬁnancial markets.
Against this backdrop, we focus our attention on the spreads between
2EURIBOR rates (unsecured) and Overnight Index Swaps (OIS; risk free)
(OIS spreads) of various maturities; being sceptical about the feasibility of
clear-cut separating credit and liquidity risks, i.e. liquidity and solvency
banking problems in the context of the ongoing systemic ﬁnancial crisis, due
to the chain of derivatives contracts and the opacity of interbank linkages
and over-the-counter transactions, it is assumed that spreads between un-
secured and secured/risk free money market interest rates are best seen as
indicators of stress in the money market, reﬂecting three inter-related fac-
tors: (1) credit/counterparty risk1; (2) liquidity funding/hoarding risk2;a n d
(3) investor sentiment/risk appetite/conﬁdence3.
Most of the previous empirical work on the ﬁnancial crisis has largely
overlooked the complexity of the market environment and its implications
for the statistical properties of the data. For example, the empirical analy-
sis in Taylor and Williams (2009) relies on the strong correlation between
money market spreads and CDS, assessing the eﬀectiveness of central bank
actions using dummy variable techniques within a no-arbitrage framework,
to conclude that the former are a measure of credit risk only. This approach
essentially treats liquidity risk as a residual, i.e. of an OLS-type regression
of money market spreads on CDS spreads, and residuals may well capture
other factors beyond liquidity risk; also, the linkage between money markets
spreads and CDS may be unstable. Finally, during crisis periods prices do
not necessarily fully reﬂect market clearing conditions (i.e. there are limits
to arbitrage) and quantities are “clearing” the market (i.e. emergence of ra-
tioning); therefore, non-arbitrage models may fail to capture the underlying
dynamics of risk factors during systemic crisis periods4.
Diﬀerently, motivated by the “shocking” evidence of non-stationary be-
havior of money market spreads during the crisis, we investigate the eco-
nomic and statistical features of money market turbulence by means of a
novel Fractionally Integrated Heteroskedastic Factor Vector Autoregressive
1Both EURIBOR and OIS rates incorporate expectations of the average overnight rate
until maturity; these expectations cancel out when one computes EURIBOR-OIS spreads
using rates of the same maturity, singling out, among other, counterparty risk which is
priced in the EURIBOR rate but not in the OIS rate.
2A bank may not always be able to borrow in the overnight interbank market, i.e. credit
lines are tightened following a rating downgrade, exposing to funding linquidity risk. A
bank may also build up “excess reserves” (liquidity hoarding), in response to uncertainty
about the valuation of its own assets and the availability of longer-term funding. See also
Eisenschimdt and Tapking, 2009.
3As emphasized by Akerlof and Shiller (2009), animal spirits may have played an
important role in the build up and unfolding of the crisis.
4That limited arbitrage is pervasive even under non-crisis market conditions is one of
the corner stones of Behavioral Finance (see Shleifer 2000).
3(FI-HFVAR) model. This approach allows for an accurate modelling of the
persistence properties of the data, and decomposing the OIS spreads into
t h r e ec o m p o n e n t sb e a r i n ge c onomic interpretation.
To preview the main ﬁndings of the paper, most of the non stationarity
in the OIS spreads can be associated with the two waves of magniﬁed stress
in the interbank market, the ﬁrst after 9 August 2007 and the second after 16
September 2008, which led to permanent changes in the levels, variances and
persistence of the spreads. These capture the long lasting (permanent) eﬀects
of the ﬁnancial market crisis on credit risk, liquidity risk and conﬁdence. The
increasing trend in the OIS spreads was broken and reversed after the ECB
c u ti t sk e yp o l i c yr a t eb y7 5b p s ,am o v et h a tt o o km a r k e t sb ys u r p r i s e .
This, together with other policy measures, like the policy of full allotment
at a ﬁxed rate in all reﬁnancing operations, including longer-term maturities
and TAF-related US dollar credit provided by the ECB, may have paved the
way for a gradual reversal in market sentiment, and reduction in credit and
liquidity risk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the econometric methodology. Section 3 reports the econometric results on
persistence and Section 4 on copersistence and the estimation of the FI-
HVAR. Section 5 concludes.
2 Econometric methodology
T h ed y n a m i c so ft h eO I Si n t e r e s tr a t es p r e a d s( ) are modelled according
to the following fractionally integrated heteroskedastic factor vector autore-
gressive (FI-HFVAR) model
 = Λ + Λ + ()(−1 − Λ−1 − Λ−1)+(1)
 ∼ (0Σ)






()( − )=[ () − ()]
2
 (3)
where  is a -variate vector of real valued integrated processes subject
to structural breaks,  =1 ,  is the lag operator,  is a -variate vector
of heteroskedastic integrated, of order  in mean, and  in variance, common
factors, with 0 ≤  ≤ 1, 0 ≤  ≤ 1=1 ,  is an -variate vector
of common break processes,  is a -variate vector of zero mean idiosyn-
cratic i.i.d. shocks, with contemporaneous covariance matrix Σ, assumed
to be coherent with the condition of weak cross-sectional correlation of the
4idiosyncratic components (Assumption E) stated in Bai (2003, p.143),  is
a -variate vector of common zero mean i.i.d. shocks, with covariance ma-
trix Σ = ,  []=0all , Λ and Λ are  ×  and  × ,
respectively, matrices of loadings, () is a ﬁnite order stationary matrix of
polynomials in the lag operator, i.e. () ≡ 1 + 22 +  + , 












1 2(1 − )
2(1 − )
ª
are diagonal stationary polynomial matrices in the lag operator of order .
Hence,  is the time dependent -variate conditional variance vector process,
deﬁned as  =  (|Ω−1), following the -(11) process of
Baillie and Morana (2009), where  is the long-term conditional variance
process or the break in variance process. Non negativity constraints, in-
volving the , ,a n d parameters, for well deﬁned conditional variance
processes are discussed in Baillie and Morana (2009) and imposed in estima-
tion following the exponential speciﬁcation of Engle and Rangel (2008). The
long memory factors , are also assumed to be conditionally orthogonal, i.e.
 = ( |Ω−1)=0all .
2.1 Estimation and properties
Estimation of the FI-HVAR model can be achieved following a multi-step
procedure, involving:
i) persistence analysis, to determine whether the series contains either
long memory or structural breaks or both;
ii) copersistence analysis, using principal components analysis (PCA), to
determine whether the long memory and or structural break components are
common across series;
iii) iterative estimation, conditional to the estimated fractional diﬀer-
encing parameter in i) and the initial estimate of the unobserved common
features in ii), of the parameters (OLS) and unobserved features (PCA) in
the model;
iv) the above procedure is simulated, in order to obtain median esti-
mates of the parameters of interest, and conﬁdence intervals robust to model
misspeciﬁcation; identiﬁcation of the common and idiosyncratic shocks is
performed by means of a Choleski based approach, and impulse response
functions and forecast error decomposition computed.
5v) the conditional variance of the common long memory factors and series
can be estimated by implementing an A-FIGARCH version of the O-GARCH
model of Alexander (2002), using median factor estimated residuals.
Consistency and eﬃciency properties of the above estimation procedure,
as well as full details on the actual implementation of the procedure are dis-
cussed in Morana (2010). Monte Carlo results, provided in Morana (2010),
yield full support to the proposed methodology, being accurate under several
scenarios, featuring either short or long memory, both covariance station-
ary and non stationary, observational noise, relatively small cross-sectional
dimensions and small time series samples.
3 Statistical features of OIS spreads in crisis
times
The sample covered in the econometric analysis runs from 20 June 2005
until 7 April 2009, for a total of 992 working days. The data set is composed
of ﬁfteen OIS interest rate spreads, from the 1-week maturity (1
 )t ot h e
1-year maturity (12
 ). The data is of daily frequency and its source is
REUTERS.
3.1 Persistence analysis
Persistence in spreads may be due to either long memory or structural breaks,
or both; a modelling framework allowing to account for both features, and to
distinguish among them, should then be employed. The Dolado et al. (2004,
DGM) structural break test, modiﬁed to account for a general and unknown
structural break process (Morana, 2009), has therefore been employed in
order to assess the source of persistence in the investigated series. Moreover,
also the Bai and Perron (1998, BP) test has been employed in order to gauge
evidence on the number and location of break points. Finally, the Moulines
and Soulier (1999, BBLP) broad band log periodogram estimator has been
employed to assess the degree of fractional integration of the actual and
break-free OIS spreads.
3.1.1 Deterministic persistence
As shown in Table 1, for the conditional mean equation, the evidence points
to two break points with similar location across maturities, the former occur-
ing between 9 August and 16 August 2007, and the latter on 16 September
2008, which can be related to the starting days of the two stress waves in
6the money market. The beginning of the ﬁrst wave is on 9 August 2007, i.e.
the day the French bank BNP Paribas revealed its inability to value struc-
tured products for three of its investment funds. The crisis triggered several
interventions by the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve,
injecting extra overnight funds.5 The interbank market stress was indeed
sizable, with the average spread moving from a range of 3b.p. (1-week) to
7b.p. (1-year), to a range of 15b.p. to 74b.p. until 15 September 2008.6
After 16 September 2008, the day after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,
which can be taken as the starting day for the second wave of money market
stress7, the OIS spreads climbed rapidly, to reach maximum values in the
range of 100b.p. to 233b.p. between October 8 and October 13, depending
on the maturity (sample average values after the second wave of stress are
in the range 28b.p. to 155b.p.). In the face of major diﬃculties in the bank-
ing sector in the US and Europe, policy rate cuts, various forms of liquidity
provision and non-standard monetary policy measures after short-term mar-
ket rates reached zero or near-zero levels. These measures were taken by
central banks with the aim of defreezing the interbank and credit markets,
and easing the banking sector from the burden of non-performing assets, as
well as to facilitate its recapitalization, supported by the intervention of the
governments.8
Moreover, also 5 December 2008 could be selected as an additional break
point, which coincides with the 75b.p. cut announced on 4 December 2008
by the ECB and implemented on 10 December 2008. In addition to a size-
able contraction in the OIS spreads, in the range -11% to -31% (-16% on
average), also a reversal in the OIS spreads trend can be observed: since
5 December 2008 OIS spreads have steadily decreased, converging towards
ﬁrst stress wave levels; yet, by the end of our sample, i.e. 7 April 2009,
only the one-, two- and three-week rates had actually achieved pre-Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy levels; for the one-year rate the distance was still close
to 20b.p.. This ﬁnding is fully consistent with the evidence that the ﬁnancial
crisis spilled over to the real economy since the fourth quarter of 2008.
As the minimum regime length is ﬁxed at 0.15,t h es i g n i ﬁcance of the
suggested additional break point could not be tested by means of the BP
5A Federal funds rate cut of 50 b.p. was implemented on 17 August 2007. Additional
Fed funds rate cuts were implemented on 18 September 2007 (50 b.p.) and 31 October
2007 (25 b.p.).
6See Brunnermaier (2009) for insights on the US sub-prime credit crisis.
7It is September 16 2008, rather than September 15 2008, the starting day of the second
wave of panic for Europe, due to lagged markets opening eﬀects.
8See Reis (2009) for insights on the policies implemented by the Fed during the crisis,
and Section 4 concerning ECB policies.
7test. Implementation within the DGM testing framework, however, sug-
gests that the additional selected break point, as well as the changing slope
structure, is appropriate for the data investigated (see the next Section for
details). Moreover, as the changes in the level of the variables occur consec-
utively in the range of few days, rather than in just a single day, the break
process speciﬁcation should allow for a step function, with break structure
as discussed above, yet with smooth transition across regimes. The proposed
dummy model with smooth cubic spline transition (DCSM) is implemented
by means of a two-step procedure, i.e. the application of OLS estimation
ﬁrst, and then spline smoothing in the neighborhood of the break points
in the estimated dummy break process (see Silverman (1985) for details on
estimation of spline functions).
Also the volatility component has been assessed for structural breaks by
means of the BP test, using the absolute ﬁrst diﬀerence of the spreads as
volatility proxy. While the increase in long-term volatility triggered by the
unfolding of the crisis and the spreading of the ﬁrst stress wave is undis-
putable (from a range of 1.0b.p. to 1.5b.p., across maturities, over the pre-
turmoil period, to a range of 9b.p. to 19b.p. over the ﬁrst stress wave period),
less clear-cut is whether a further increase in long-term volatility occurred
following the spreading of the second stress wave (to a range of 20b.p. to
45b.p. over the second stress wave period). As shown in Table 1, the loca-
tion of the break points for the conditional variance equation is similar to the
ﬁndings for the conditional mean equation, with breaks occurring around 9
August 2007 and 16 September 2008. Yet, the selection of the latter break
point is not robust to the selection method employed: consistent with the
ﬁndings for the spreads levels, a progressive reduction in volatility towards
ﬁrst stress wave’s overall levels can be noted at the end of the investigated
sample.9 Hence, after some experimentation, a single break point, i.e. 9
August 2007, has been retained for the conditional variance equation.
Hence, the following break process speciﬁcations have been employed:
 =( 0 + 11 + 22 + 33 + 44) t ()
for the conditional mean equation, and
 =( 0 + 11) t ()
for the conditional variance equation,
9The modiﬁed BIC criterion (LWZ) points to a single break point occurring on 9 August
2007 for all the series, apart from maturities between the two-month and seven-month
horizon. The results are avaialble upon request from the authors.
8where  =1 ,  =9 9 2 , 1 is a (ﬁr s ts t r e s sw a v e )s t e pd u m m y
variable with unity value over the period 9 August 2007 to 7 April 2009
inclusive, 2 is a (second stress wave) step dummy variable with unity value
over the period 16 September 2008 to 7 April 2009 inclusive, 3 is a (second
stress wave) broken linear trend variable, with non-zero values over the period
16 September 2008 to 4 December 2008 inclusive, 4 is a (stress resolution)
broken linear trend variable, with non-zero values over the period 5 December
2008 to 7 April 2009 inclusive, and () accounts for the smooth cubic spline
transition across regimes.
3.1.2 Stochastic persistence
As shown in Table 1, according to the BBLP estimator, strong (non station-
ary) long memory, not statistically diﬀerent across maturities, can be found
in the actual OIS spreads, with an average estimated fractional diﬀerencing
parameter of about 0.94. Due to the break in the unconditional mean and
variance of the OIS spreads, the fractional diﬀerencing parameter has also
been estimated for the break-free series, standardized according to the se-
lected regimes for their unconditional variance. Results show that sizable
long memory can also be found in the standardized break-free series, in the
range 0.24 to 0.64 (0.40 on average). A statistically signiﬁcant hump-shaped
proﬁle can be noted in the cross-section of persistence, the latter increasing
with maturity up to the three-week horizon and decreasing thereafter. Yet,
similar persistence can be found for consecutive maturities.
The ﬁnding of signiﬁcant long memory in both the actual and standard-
ized break-free speciﬁcations points to non spurious structural change in the
OIS spreads, as, otherwise, evidence of overdiﬀerencing, i.e. a negative esti-
mate for the fractional diﬀerencing parameter, would be expected (Granger
and Hyung, 2004). The DGM test supports the latter conclusion, pointing
to signiﬁcant break processes, of the DCSM type, for all the (actual) OIS
spreads, as the null of pure long memory process is rejected in all cases, at
the 5% signiﬁcance level.10
Evidence of signiﬁcant instability can also be detected in the estimated
persistence parameter, when computed separately for the pre-crisis and crisis
periods. The null of temporal stability is in fact strongly rejected both using a
Bonferroni bounds joint test and a maturi t yb ym a t u r i t yp a i r w i s ec o m p a r i s o n
(see Table 1).
10Critical values for the test have been computed by simulation, also allowing for un-
conditional heteroskedasticity under the null. Details are available upon request from the
authors.
94 The FI-HFVAR model
Given the evidence of both long memory and structural breaks in the level
of the OIS spreads, consistent with the multi-step procedure to be imple-
mented for estimation of the FI-HVAR model, the presence of commonalities
in the break process and (break-free) long memory components has been in-
vestigated. Commonalities for each component, across the term structure,
should be expected, since, as shown in Table 2, for the actual OIS interest
rate spreads, PCA singles out a single factor accounting for about 99% of
total variance, and over 95% of the variance for each OIS spreads, from the
2-week maturity onwards.
4.1 Cobreaking and common long memory factor analy-
sis
4.1.1 Level factor of OIS spreads
As shown in Table 2, the strong commonality detected for the actual vari-
ables, can also be noted once the break process component is isolated from
the long memory component. In fact, PCA singles out a single common break
process accounting for over 99% of total variance for the break process series,
the latter also accounting for about or over 90% of the variability for each
break series (Figure 1, top plot). The latter component, being related to the
two waves of increasing bank stress, captures the level of OIS spreads in the
crisis period, reﬂecting, among other factors, conﬁdence (risk appetite).
Of particular interest is the break point following the announcement of
the larger than expected rate cut by the ECB on 5 December 2008, when a
declining trend in the levels of the OIS spreads started. The latter highlights
the importance of the rate cuts by the ECB (as well as by other central banks)
in contributing to improving the level of conﬁdence in the money market.
Of course, rate cuts also contributed directly to improving the credit and
liquidity prospects for banks.11 As shown in Figure 2, the declining trend
coincides with the timing of the rate cuts by the ECB in a sequence of
steps (ﬁve in the sample period; middle plot), reinforcing the full allotment
policy12, started in October 2008, which generated excess liquidity in the
11In a risk-neutral valuation framework the probability of default and the recovery rate
are the main determinants of the credit spread. A decrease in the level of the short-term
rate may lead to a decrease in the probability of default.
12The latter policy consisted in allotting in full at a ﬁxed rate all bids submitted by
banks at all open market operations conducted by the ECB for all maturities (one-week,
one-, three- and six-month maturities) in the sample period.
10money market (middle plot). As illustrated in Figure 2 (after observation
863, middle plot), the liquidity surplus led to systematic and large recourse to
the deposit facility of the Eurosystem13, so that the ECB was simultaneously
providing longer-term credit to the banking system and taking short-term
deposits from it, in short, playing a ﬁnancial intermediary role.
Finally, note that towards the end of the sample period (after observation
900), while the common spreads level was on a declining trend a measure of
banks’ credit risk (iTraxx Euro Financials) kept on rising, thereby casting
some doubts about any stable relationship between OIS spreads and CDS-
based measures of credit risk (bottom plot); indeed this evidence gives strong
support to the hypothesis that beyond credit risk considerations, liquidity
risk and/or conﬁdence factors were also relevant in explaining the evolution
of the OIS spreads, also casting doubts on the robustness of the ﬁndings in
Taylor and Williams (2009).
4.1.2 Curvature and slope factors of OIS spreads
Turning to the long memory components, PCA singles out two common long
memory factors (Figure 1, central plots), jointly accounting for over 80%
of total variance (65% and 18%, respectively), the former aﬀecting all the
maturities, and the latter being closely related to the shortest maturities;
as higher order principal components mainly capture idiosyncratic features,
also the selection of the common long memory factors is then clear-cut. As
shown in Table 2, in terms of their persistence properties, both stochastic
factors show the long memory feature, with estimated fractional diﬀerencing
parameters consistent with the ﬁndings of persistence analysis: the estimated
parameters are 0.32 and 0.52, for the ﬁrst and second principal components,
respectively, and 0.42 on average. Subsample (pre-crisis and crisis) estima-
tion and testing, point to a signiﬁcant increase in persistence following the
unfolding of the crisis (doubling for the ﬁrst factor and a three fold increase
for the second factor), moving from stationary long memory (the fractional
diﬀerencing parameters are 0.24 and 0.44 for the ﬁrst and second factor,
respectively) for the pre-crisis sample to non stationary long memory (the
fractional diﬀerencing parameter is 0.87 for both cases) for the crisis sample.
The discontinuity in persistence can be easily appreciated in Figure 1, show-
13Excess liquidity is measured by the daily net recourse to the deposit facility of the
Eurosystem (NSF = recourse to marginal lending facility - recourse to the deposit facility).
The deposit facility has an overnight maturity and its remuneration is below market rates
thereby setting the ﬂoor for the level of the overnight interest rate. The marginal lending
facility has also an overnight maturity and has a penalty rate thereby setting the ceiling
for the overnight interest rate.
11ing a sizable increase in persistence following 9 August 2007 (observation
559), as the (standardized) common long memory factors appear to be much
smoother than before.
Long memory and structural change also aﬀect the volatility of the com-
mon long memory factors; while long memory in variance is not strong, as
the estimated persistence parameters are about 0.10 and 0.23, for the ﬁrst
and second common long memory factors, respectively, the change in the
level and range of variation of volatility, after the unfolding of the crisis, is
remarkable (a four fold increase) (Figure 1, bottom plots). For both factors
the increase in volatility was particularly strong at the outset of the crisis
in August 2007 and following Lehman bankruptcy in mid September 2008;
reversion to pre-Lehman volatility levels is already evident starting from mid
December 2008, and possibly associated with the progression of interest rate
cuts, reinforcing the excess liquidity creation achieved by the full allotment
policy.
Curvature factor of OIS spreads As shown in Table 3, although the ﬁrst
common long memory factor accounts for dynamics common to all the OIS
spreads, it is dominating for maturities above one-month and, in particular,
for maturities between three and six-months. This feature is reminiscent of
a curvature factor capturing the medium-term evolution in the OIS spreads
during the crisis period. As illustrated in Figure 3 (top plot) the peaks in this
component coincide with moments when the major central banks announced
coordinated actions, in particular announcements on US dollar operations
which, in the context of the US Fed Term Auction Facility (TAF), allowed
banks outside the US market to get US dollar funding directly (against collat-
eral), namely from European central banks (i.e. ECB, Bank of England and
Swiss National Bank).14 Note that after each of the three major announce-
ments highlighted by vertical bars in Figure 3 (top plot) this component of
OIS spreads either declined sizably or stabilized, suggesting some eﬀective-
ness of the measures in alleviating money market tensions.15 In fact, the
14The US dollars were provided by the US Fed to the European central banks via
bilateral swap lines.
15The ﬁrst two bars (observations 648 and 650, December 12 and 14 2007) correspond
to: 1) communication on joint action ECB and US Fed Res on dollar funding via USD TAF
(2 auctions were announced with 28 and 35 day maturities to be conducted on 17/Dec/07
and 20/Dec/07 up to USD 20 billion); 2) joint announcement of measures to address
money market tensions by Bank of Canada, BoE, ECB, US Fed, and SNB). The third bar
(observation 712, March13 2008) corresponds to joint announcement by ECB, BoEngland,
US Fed, BoCan, SwissNB on USD operations. The fourth bar (observation 863, August 10
2008) corresponds to the day of the announcement of full allotment in (TAF-related) ECB
US dollar credit operations, matched by a correspondent swap line of unlimited amount
12cross correlation analysis suggests that the announcements on coordinated
actions are positively correlated to developments in the ﬁrst common long
memory factor (Figure 3; middle panel, left hand side plot).
Of interest is also the cross-correlation with the share of longer-term re-
ﬁnancing operations in total reﬁnancing volume (LTRO/Total) (Figure 3;
lower panel, left hand side plot), which is negative and signiﬁcant, suggest-
ing that the ECB policy of increasing the share of longer-term operations in
the total outstanding reﬁnancing volume (one-month, three-month and six-
month maturities), contributed to decreasing the OIS spreads, in particular,
between the three and six months maturities (indeed a kind of curvature
eﬀect).
Slope factor of OIS spreads The second common long memory factor
mainly explains dynamics at the shortest end of the OIS spreads term struc-
ture. This feature is reminiscent of a slope factor capturing the medium-term
evolution in the OIS spreads during the crisis period. This slope factor might
capture a “pure” liquidity risk component. Interestingly as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4 (top plot) there seems to be a close correlation during the crisis between
this component and large volume ﬁne-tuning operations (FTOs) conducted
by the ECB. Note that negative ﬁne-tuning operations refer to liquidity ab-
sorbing operations and positive FTOs to liquidity providing ones. Thus, the
positive contemporaneous correlation between the second long-memory com-
ponent and FTOs indeed suggests that the former captures movements in
the OIS spreads associated with shorter-term liquidity imbalances, which are
being "corrected" by the ECB (Figure 4; middle panel, right hand side plot).
Also the cross-correlation with the share of longer-term reﬁnancing op-
erations in total reﬁnancing volume (LTRO/Total) (Figure 4; lower panel,
left hand side plot), statistically signiﬁcant and positive, is of some interest:
the ECB policy of increasing the share of longer-term operations in the to-
tal outstanding reﬁnancing volume, whilst contributing to decreasing term
spreads (curvature eﬀe c td o c u m e n t e da b o v e ) ,l e dt oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eO I S
spreads at the very short-end of the money market curve, in what looks like
a substitution (slope) eﬀect.
4.2 Further results for the FI-HFVAR model
In the light of PCA results, pointing to a single common break process and
two common long memory factors, the dimension of the FI-HFVAR model
is set to seventeen equations, corresponding to the ﬁfteen money market
from the US Fed to the ECB.
13OIS spreads plus the two common long memory factors. In the light of the
detected instability in persistence, the model has been estimated by allowing
the fractional diﬀerencing parameter to take diﬀerent values for the pre-
crisis and crisis period. Moreover, median estimates of the parameters and
conﬁdence intervals have been computed by selecting the order of the short
memory autoregressive polynomial (()) by information criteria, yielding
a ﬁrst order optimal model, and then setting to ten the order of the long
memory autoregressive polynomial (Φ()) and to 1000 the number of Monte
Carlo replications. Also, consistent with the ﬁnding of structural instability
in the unconditional variance for the OIS spreads, the unconditional variance-
covariance matrix employed for the policy analysis has been allowed to change
according to the sub period (pre-crisis/crisis) investigated.
4.3 Forecast error variance decomposition and impulse
response analysis
The results of the forecast error variance decomposition are clear-cut, and
reported in Table 3; two horizons, i.e. 1-day and 20-day, have been considered
in the analysis.
Firstly, for the pre-crisis period, independently of the maturity, the joint
contribution of the common factor shocks to ﬂuctuations is similar for both
horizons, i.e. 57% to 92% (1-day) and 48% to 99% (20-day); 90% on average
for both cases; diﬀerently, for the crisis period the common shocks are always
dominating at long horizons (85% to 100%; 98% on average), yet dominating
at short horizons only from the 4-month maturity onwards (14% to 42%
from 1-week to 3-month, 29% on average; 77% to 99% from 4-month to 1-
year, 96% on average). Hence, as a consequence of the crisis, short-term
ﬂuctuations have become more idiosyncratic, particularly at the very short
end of the term structure (particularl yl a r g ei st h ec o n t r i b u t i o no ft h eo w n
idiosyncratic shock for the 1-week maturity, i.e. about 90%, and still sizable
within the three-month maturity, i.e. 70% on average).
Secondly, for the pre-crisis period, the curvature factor never accounts
for more than 30% of ﬂuctuations within the 3-month maturity, and for no
less than 40% for longer maturities. Interestingly, a hump shaped proﬁle
can be detected, with the curvature factor being relatively more important
for medium-term maturities (3- to 9-month) than at the short or long end
of the term structure. A similar evidence can also be found for the crisis
period. Yet, for the latter period, the curvature factor yields a more uniform
contribution across maturities. For instance, while its contribution, at the 1-
day horizon, is never above 20% within the 3-month maturity, at the 20-day
14horizon its contribution is never below 30%.
Thirdly, the second factor, i.e. the slope factor, is dominating at the very
short and long end of the term structure, albeit important diﬀerences can
be detected for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Over the pre-crisis period,
the slope factor never accounts for less than 50% of total ﬂuctuations for
maturities within the 3-month and beyond the 9-month horizon, at both the
1-day and 20-day horizon. On the other hand, over the crisis period, due
to the increased importance of idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations, the proportion of
accounted variance is lower, i.e. never larger than 30% at the 1-day horizon
( w i t h i nt h e3 - m o n t hm a t u r i t y ) ,a n dj u st over 50% at the 20-day horizon (yet
only within the 1-month maturity); the contribution of the slope factor is
then sizable again for maturities at the long end of the term structure, i.e.
over 25% from the 9-month maturity onwards at the 1-day horizon.
Concerning the impulse response analysis, as shown in Figure 5, major
diﬀerences can be noted between the pre-crisis and crisis periods, both in
terms of magnitude and persistence of common factor shocks, as well as
of response proﬁles. Important diﬀerences can also be noted, within each
period, across maturities, as it is portrayed by the comparison between the
results for the 1-week and 1-year maturities.
Concerning curvature shocks (top four plots), both the persistence and
magnitude of the impact increase, in general, with the maturity of the OIS
spreads. For instance, over the pre-crisis period, the curvature shock has
a ﬁve fold larger impact on the 1-year OIS spread than on the 1-week OIS
spread; moreover, while the rate of decay of the shock is much faster for the
1-week rate, with a zero point impact attained already after one day, for the
1-year rate about twenty days are required for full point dissipation; a similar
gap in the magnitude of the impact across maturities can also be detected
for the crisis period; yet, as shown by the response proﬁles, shock persistence
is much higher over the crisis period (hump-shaped proﬁle) than over the
pre-crisis period (monotonic decay), with dissipation occurring well beyond
twenty days.
Concerning slope shocks (bottom four plots), a similar impact, in absolute
terms, can be found across maturities. Yet, beyond the 3-month maturity,
diﬀerent from shorter maturities, a positive slope factor shock exercises a
negative impact on the OIS spreads. Moreover, diﬀerent from the curvature
factor shock, slightly stronger persistence can also be detected for shorter
maturities than for longer maturities for both periods, while, similarly to the
curvature factor shock, the rate of decay of shocks is much faster over the
pre-crisis (monotonic decay) than the crisis period (hump-shaped proﬁle).
Diﬀerences between periods can also be found concerning the eﬀects of
idiosyncratic shocks (not reported). While the response proﬁle is similar,
15pointing to a monotonic decay in both cases, over the crisis period a ﬁve
fold larger impact can be detected. Moreover, stronger persistence can be
detected for shorter maturities than for longer maturities, full dissipation
requiring about ten and ﬁve days, respectively.
5 Conclusions
In this paper the consequences of the recent ﬁnancial turmoil for the euro area
money market have been assessed by investigating the persistence properties
of the mean and variance of the OIS spreads in the framework of a FI-HVAR
model. It is found that most of the non stationarity in the OIS spreads can be
associated with the two waves of magniﬁed stress in the interbank market, the
ﬁrst after 9 August 2007 and the second after 16 September 2008, which led
to permanent changes in the levels, variances and persistence of the spreads,
and therefore to long lasting (permanent) eﬀects of the ﬁnancial market crisis
on conﬁdence, and credit and liquidity risks. Deviations of the OIS spreads
from their long-term (time-varying) values tend to be corrected slowly due
to their long memory feature. Also, the increasing trend in the OIS spreads
was broken and reversed after the ECB cut its key policy rate by 75 bps on
December 2008; this, together with other policy measures, like the policy of
full allotment at a ﬁxed rate in all reﬁnancing operations, may have paved
the way for a gradual reversal in market sentiment, and reduction in credit
and liquidity risks. An important question that is left open is the permanent
consequences of the crisis on the money market which may not necessarily
return to pre-crisis features. While a reduction in persistence to stationary
long memory could be expected, i.e. mean reverting spreads, as well as a
sizable contraction in volatility, the level of OIS spreads might not come
back to pre-crisis values. Surely, a peculiar feature of the pre-crisis euro area
money market was the virtual absence of OIS spreads. As a consequence
of the crisis, sizable OIS spreads became a feature of the money market.
Whether they will remain so also in the future is an open question.
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Figure 1: level factor (CBP), (standardized) curvature (CLMF1) and slope
(CLMF2) factors and their volatility (csd CLMF1, csd CLMF2).




















Figure 2: level factor (CBP), minimum bid rate (MBR), net standing
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Figure 3: (standardized) curvature factor (CLMF1) and main coordinated
central bank actions (top plot). Cross correlation functions of CLMF1 with
main coordinated central bank actions, ﬁne tuning operations (FTO), long
term operations/total operation (LTROs/Total), and frontloading of the
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Figure 4: (standardized) slope factor (CLMF2) and ﬁne tuning operations
(FTO) (top plot). Cross correlation functions of CLMF2 with main
coordinated central bank actions, ﬁne tuning operations (FTO), long term
operations/total operation (LTROs/Total), and frontloading of the
fulﬁlment of the reserve requirements (DRS) (other plots).
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Figure 5: impulse responses, with 95% conﬁdence interval, to a unitary
curvature factor (CLMF1) shock and slope factor (CLMF2) shock, for the
pre-crisis (left hand side plots) and crisis (right hand side plots) periods, for
the 1-week (1w) and 1-year (1y) maturities.
23Table 1: EO spreads, persistence analysis: structural breaks tests and long memory analysis 
 
Structural break tests  Long memory analysis 
  Bai-Perron  DGM  MS broad band log periodogram 
  mean  volatility  0 s    mean 
  break  BIC  break  BIC  DCSM  actual  bfDCSM eqDCSM 
1w w   558, 844  -4.758  557, 844  -6.883  0.005  0.857 (0.041)  0.455 (0.041)  1E-05 
2w w   560, 844  -4.580  558, 844  -6.643  0.005  0.899 (0.041)  0.600 (0.041)  0.012 
3w w   560, 844  -4.311  557, 844  -6.887  0.005  0.980 (0.041)  0.644 (0.041)  0.003 
1m w   561, 844  -3.793  558, 844  -7.183  0.010  1.029 (0.041)  0.567 (0.041)  2E-04 
2m w   561, 844  -3.697  553, 844  -7.797  0.025  1.035 (0.041)  0.472 (0.041)  1E-10 
3m w   562, 844  -3.699  553, 844  -8.015  0.050  0.996 (0.041)  0.459 (0.041)  1E-10 
4m w   562, 844  -3.683  554, 844  -7.863  0.030  0.962 (0.041)  0.386 (0.041)  1E-10 
5m w   563, 844  -3.626  554, 844  -7.744  0.010  0.939 (0.041)  0.370 (0.041)  1E-10 
6m w   563, 844  -3.584  554, 844  -7.715  0.005  0.934 (0.041)  0.344 (0.041)  1E-10 
7m w   563, 844  -3.522  558, 844  -7.603  0.005  0.934 (0.041)  0.327 (0.041)  1E-10 
8m w   563, 844  -3.453  558, 844  -7.506  0.005  0.919 (0.041)  0.307 (0.041)  1E-10 
9m w   563, 844  -3.383  558, 844  -7.420  0.005  0.918 (0.041)  0.275 (0.041)  1E-10 
10m w   563, 844  -3.319  554, 844  -7.343  0.005  0.912 (0.041)  0.260 (0.041)  1E-10 
11m w   563, 844  -3.257  548, 844  -7.296  0.005  0.904 (0.041)  0.244 (0.041)  1E-10 
1y w   563, 844  -3.196  548, 844  -7.265  0.005  0.890 (0.041)  0.277 (0.041)  3E-10 
mean          0.941 (0.041)  0.399 (0.041)  0.001 
b test          0.002 1E-10    
bsub test              1E-10 
 
In the Table the results of the Bai-Perron (BP, columns 1 to 4) and Dolado-Gonzalo-Mayoral structural break tests are 
reported. The BP tests have been carried out on both the actual series xt and on a volatility proxy obtained from | ∆xt |. 
In the table, the estimated location of the selected break points and the associated BIC value are reported.  The DGM 
test has been carried out assuming a time-varying unconditional variance. The latter takes two values according to the 
estimated values for the period 20/06/05 to 8/08/07 and 9/08/07 to 7/04/09. In the table the p-value of the DGM test has 
bee reported for the dummy-spline model (DCSM), for the zero-lag case (s = 0). The estimated fractional differencing 
parameters, with standard errors in brackets, for the actual and DCSM break-free (bf) series, obtained using the 
Moulines and Soulier (1999) broad band log periodogram estimator, are also reported (columns 6-9). “b test” is the p-
value of the test of equality of the fractional differencing parameter across maturities, while “bsub test” is the p-value of 
the test of equality of the fractional differencing parameter across maturities and subsamples. Finally, eqDCSM, for each 
maturity, is the p-value of the test for the equality of the fractional differencing parameter across subsamples. The 
results are reported for the various EO spreads maturities available, i.e. from 1-week (
1w w ) to one-year (
1y w ). 
 
 Table 2: EO spreads, copersistence (principal components) analysis 
 
Panel A: Principal components analysis 
 actual  bpDCSM bfDCSM 
  f1  f1  f1  f2 
tot  0.997  0.997 0.651  0.175 
        
1w w   0.907 0.897  0.086  0.410 
2w w   0.975 0.959  0.152  0.583 
3w w   0.983 0.969  0.227  0.553 
1m w   0.968 0.953  0.341  0.437 
2m w   0.982 0.990  0.559  0.112 
3m w   0.988 0.992  0.717  0.031 
4m w   0.995 0.997  0.826  0.005 
5m w   0.998 0.999  0.878  0.002 
6m w   0.999 0.999  0.935  0.017 
7m w   0.999 0.999  0.924  0.044 
8m w   0.999 0.999  0.896  0.069 
9m w   0.999 0.999  0.863  0.080 
10m w   0.998 0.998  0.816  0.083 
11 w   0.996 0.997  0.785  0.094 
1y w   0.994 0.996  0.764  0.102 
 
Panel B: Long memory analysis of common stochastic factors 
  d    (se) eq  dpc    (se) d c   (se) 
1,DCSM f   0.320 (0.041)  1E-10  0.243 (0.054)  0.886 (0.062) 
2,DCSM f   0.516 (0.041)  1E-07  0.441 (0.054)  0.874 (0.062) 
mean  0.418 (0.041)  0.070  0.342 (0.054)  0.880 (0.062) 
b test  1E-10   1E-10  0.026 
bsub test   1E-10     
 
 
Panel A in the table reports the results of the principal components analysis carried out for the actual EO spreads, their 
break process (bp) and (normalized) break-free (bf) components, obtained from the cubic spline dummy model 
(DCSM). For each set of series the first row (tot) shows the fraction of the total variance explained by each principal 
component  fi (i=1,...2); the subsequent fifteen rows display the fraction of the variance of the individual series 
attributable to each fi. Panel B reports the results of the long memory analysis carried out on the first two principal 
components (fi), extracted from the  break-free EO spreads using the dummy-spline model (DCSM). In the Table the 
estimated fractional differencing parameter (d), using the Moulines and Soulier (1999) broad band log periodogram 
estimator, with standard error in brackets is reported. Estimates for the full sample and for the pre-crisis (pc) and crisis 
(c) sub samples are reported.  “b test” is the p-value of the test of equality of the fractional differencing parameter 
across factors, while “bsub test” is the p-value of the test of equality of the fractional differencing parameter across 
factors and subsamples. “eq” for each factor, is the p-value of the test for the equality of the fractional differencing 






 Table 3: forecast error variance decomposition 
    pre-crisis crisis 
  Horizon 
(days) 
f1 f 2  all own f1 f 2  all own 
1  2.7 57.1  59.8 40.2  1.5 12.0  13.5 86.5  1w w  
20  1.8 50.3  52.1 47.9 27.2 57.8 85.0 15.0 
1  4.5 83.5  88.0 12.0  4.6 31.2  35.8 64.2  2w w  
20  4.0 83.1  87.1 12.9 33.9 58.6 92.4 7.6 
1  5.7 82.3  88.0 12.0  5.9 31.7  37.7 62.3  3w w  
20  4.9 81.1  86.0 14.0 41.9 52.8 94.7 5.3 
1  10.2 74.0 84.2 15.8  6.3 15.2  21.5 78.5  1m w  
20  7.8 70.6  78.4 21.6 63.6 31.2 94.8 5.2 
1  27.6 29.3 56.9 43.1 14.4 5.9 20.3 79.7  2m w  
20  23.1 25.0 48.1 51.9 90.0 6.9 96.9 3.1 
1  69.7 3.2 72.9 27.1 39.9 2.0 41.9 58.1  3m w  
20  67.7 2.9 70.6 29.4 97.8 0.9 98.7 1.3 
1  86.6 2.6 89.2 10.8 77.1 0.3 77.4 22.6  4m w  
20  87.1 2.4 89.5 10.5 99.5 0.1 99.6 0.4 
1  79.1 15.6 94.7 5.3 89.6 5.8 95.4 4.6  5m w  
20  80.4 14.8 95.2 4.8 98.7 1.2 99.9 0.1 
1  67.0 29.8 96.8 3.2 80.2 13.7 93.9 6.1  6m w  
20  68.6 28.5 97.1 2.9 96.7 3.1 99.8 0.2 
1  61.6 36.5 98.0 2.0 79.7 19.0 98.7 1.3  7m w  
20  63.3 34.9 98.2 1.8 95.6 4.4  100.0 0.0 
1  56.4 42.3 98.7 1.3 75.3 23.7 99.1 0.9  8m w  
20  58.2 40.6 98.9 1.1 94.2 5.7  100.0 0.0 
1  51.5 47.0 98.5 1.5 71.6 27.6 99.2 0.8  9m w  
20  53.6 45.1 98.6 1.4 93.0 6.9 99.9 0.1 
1  45.3 50.2 95.5 4.5 67.3 31.9 99.2 0.8  10m w  
20  47.8 48.0 95.8 4.2 91.8 8.2  100.0 0.0 
1  42.3 55.9 98.2 1.8 63.5 35.9 99.3 0.7  11m w  
20  45.2 53.0 98.2 1.8 90.6 9.4  100.0 0.0 
1  37.6 58.5 96.1 3.9 58.8 39.2 98.0 2.0  1y w  
20  41.0 55.1 96.1 3.9 89.3 10.6  100.0 0.0 
 
 
The Table reports for each EO spread the median forecast error variance decomposition at the one-day and twenty-day 
horizons, obtained from the structural VMA representation of the FI-HFVAR model. For each EO spread series the 
Table shows the percentage of forecast error variance attributable to each common factor shock (f1 and f2), together 
with their sum (all). The last column reports the percentage of the forecast error variance attributable to the own 
idiosyncratic shock (own). The results are reported for the various EO spreads maturities available, i.e. from 1-week 
(
1w w ) to one-year (
1y w ), for the pre-crisis (20/06/05 to 8/08/07) and crisis (9/08/07 to 7/04/09) periods. 
 